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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
Statutes of Limitations in California
By JACOR J. LiERIwix, N
(This is the third of the series of articles written specially fur the Denver Bar
Association Record on comparisons between Colorado and California procedure and
certain aspects of the California laws which might be of interest to Denver lawyers.
These articles are being written by Mr. Lieberman, of the Los Angeles Bar, who was
formerly a member of the Denver Bar and Trustee of the Denver Bar Association.)
NE of the most frequent difficul-
ties confronting the California
lawyer in the matter of claims
forwarded by Colorado Attorneys is
the handling of claims based upon
promissory notes which are more than
four years old. In view of the Statute
of Limitations of Colorado running six
years before barring most claims, in-
cluding claims upon contracts and
promissory notes, a Colorado lawyer
naturally does not expect to be con-
fronted with a Statute of Limitations
in California which bars such claims at
the end of four years.
The following are some of the limi-
tations of actions in California:
1. An action upon a judgment or
decree of any Court of the United
States and an action for mesne profits
of real property are barred within five
years.
2. Actions upon any contract, obli-
gation or liability founded upon an in-
strument in writing and actions to re-
cover upon book accounts and actions
upon an account stated, and actions
for lalances due upon mutual open and
current accounts are barred within
four years.
3. An action upon a liability cre-
ated by statute, other than a penalty
or forfeiture, and an action for tres-
pass upon or injury to real property
and an action for taking, detaining or
injuring chattels including actions for
the specific recovery of personal prop-
erty and an action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake are barred
within three years.
4. An action upon a contract, obli-
gation or liability not founded upon
an instrument of writing (other than
book accounts, accounts stated and
balances upon open accounts) is barred
within two years. This is likewise
true of an action based upon a con-
tract, obligation or liability evidenced
by a certificate or abstract or guaranty
of title of real property or by policy
of title insurance. An action against
a sheriff, coroner or constable upon a
liability arising out of an official act
or omission (excepting action for es-
cape) is also barred within two years.
5. An action upon a statute for a
penalty or forfeiture is barred within
one year, except where the statute im-
posing the penalty prescribes another
limitation. Also actions for libel,
slander, assault, battery, false impris-
onment, seduction or for injury to or
for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another or
by a depositor against a bank for the
payment of a forged or raised check,
are also barred within one year.
(Note that personal injury suits are
barred within one year.)
6. An action against an officer for
the recovery of property seized by the
officer in his official capacity as tax
collector or to recover the value of the
property so seized or for damages for
such seizure, detention or sale and ac-
tions to recover stock sold for delin-
quent assessments authorized by the
Corporation laws of the State of Cali-
fornia, and actions to set aside or in-
validate the act of a majority of the
trustees of a corporation which has
been dissolved by operation of law, In-
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cluding the revivor of any such Cor-
poration, are barred within six months.
Actions or claims against a county
which have been rejected by the Board
of survivors must be commenced with-
in six months after the first rejection
thereof by such board.
7. Actions to recover personal prop-
erty left in a hotel are barred within
ninety days after the date of the de-
parture of the owner of said personal
property from the hotel or lodging
house.
8. In the matter of actions for the
recovery of real property no action for
the recovery of real property can be
maintained unless it appear that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or
grantor was seized or possessed of the
property in question within five years
before the commencement of the ac-
tion.
In actions for fraud, the time com-
mences to run from the discovery of
the fraud, and in actions based upon
accounts consisting of more than one
item the statute begins running from
the time when the last item became
due.
The California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that if, when the cause
of action accrues against a person, he
is out of the State, the action may be
commenced within the term limited
after return to the State, and if, after
the cause of action accrues, he departs
from the State, the time of his absence
is no part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action. Further-
more, if a person is entitled to bring
an action, but at the time the cause of
action accrued he is either a minor or
insane or imprisoned on a criminal
charge or is a married woman where
her husband is a necessary party with
her in commencing such action, the
time of such disability is not a part of
the time limited for the commencement
of the action and the statute of limi-
tations is tolled during such period.
If a person entitled to bring an action
dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof,
and the cause of action survive, an
action may be commenced by his rep-
resentatives after the expiration of
that time and within six months from
his death. If a person against whom
an action may be brought dies before
the expiration of the time limited for
the commencement of such action, and
the cause of action survive, an action
may be commenced against his repre-
sentatives after the expiration of that
time, and within one year after the
issuing of letters testamentary or of
administration. No person can, of
course, avail himself of a disability
unless it existed when his right of ac-
tion accrued.
An important and troublesome pro-
vision of the California Code of Civil
Procedure relating to limitations of
actions is that providing that no ac-
knowledgment or promise is sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing con-
tract, by which to take the case out of
the operation of the statutes of limita-
tions, unless the same is contained in
some writing signed by the party to be
charged thereby. In other words, an
oral acknowledgment of indebtedness
is not sufficient. There must be a
written acknowledgment of the indebt-
edness or a written promise to pay in
order to toll the statute, and the writ-
ten acknowledgment must at least im-
ply a promise to pay. Part payient
alone is not a sufficient acknowledg-
ment of the indebtedness which will
extend the time of limitation. The ac-
knowledgment or implied or express
promise to pay must likewise be made
to the creditor himself or to someone
duly authorized to act for him in that
respect. An acknowledgment to a
stranger is not sufficient.
When a cause of action has arisen
in another State or In a foreign coun-
try and by the laws of that jurisdiction
an action thereon cannot there bi
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maintained against a person by reason
of the lapse of time, an action thereon
cannot be maintained against him in
California except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of California and
who has held the cause of action from
the time it accrued. In other words,
if a cause of action is barred in an-
other State, where the Statute of Limi-
tations of that other State fixes a
shorter period of limitation than the
laws of California, the action is barred
in California unless the claim be held
by a citizen of California who has held
the claim or cause of action from the
time it accrued.
In Re Capper Resolution
March 12, 1928.
H. H. Wolff, Esq.
1515 E. 9th Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Mr. Wolff:
My friend, Carl Whitehead, handed
me a copy of the March issue of the
Denver Bar Association Record, con-
taining an article in reply to Frazer
Arnold. I turn first to your debate
with Doctor Nicholas Murray Butler,
and find it most interesting because it
shows how utterly futile it is to try
to come to any agreement between two
men, one of whom would make so
many reservations in interpreting the
Capper resolution that its passage by
the Senate would mean nothing, and
the other, who is so fully committed
to the war system that he would not
entertain any proposal to avoid war
which, in his estimation, would affect
the "honor, the safety and the welfare
of his country." I wish to congratulate
you on the completeness of your reply
to Doctor Butler. In my judgment,
the reason you have not heard from
him in answer to your letter is be-
cause there is no reply to make. He
tries to defend the Capper Resolution
by reading into it something that is
not there, and you point this out con-
clusively.
Of course, Mr. Wolff, you must con-
cede that under your defense of war
there can never be a proposal made
which will "lead us forward", to use
your expression. The only way out
of war is to renounce it as an instru-
ment of national policy, to outlaw it.
This is Briand's proposal, and the rea-
son why Secretary Kellogg did not an-
swer this proposal with equal frank-
ness is because America is not yet
ready "to renounce war as an instru-
ment of national policy" It is perfect-
ly clear that the causes of war can
never be removed. Nations, as with
men, will always fall out, dispute and
quarrel, but if war is ever to be abol-
ished these nations must agree, as
with men, that they will never go to
war about their difficulties. Gun-play
between men, either in the defense of
property or in its acquisition, has been
outlawed. Between nations force is
still honored, respected and made per-
fectly legal under national law.
There are two types of men opposed
to the Capper Resolution, one whom
Admiral Plunkett well represented in
his late declaration that "the penalty
of national efficiency, either in com-
merce or in arms, is war." "If I read
history aright," he says, "we are near-
er war today than ever before, because
we are pursuing a competitive trade
policy and crowding other nations into
the background. A policy of this kind
inevitably leads to war." I recently
rode from Denver to Colorado Springs
with a former Colorado banker who
defends Admiral Plunkett's position
absolutely. This is the policy of the
United Fruit Company, whose manager
